Acerca del debate sobre el rol adaptativo de los delirios en la filosofía de la psiquiatría
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2025.10.4898Palabras clave:
Psicosis, Esquizofrenia, Delirios, Filosofía de la PsiquiatríaResumen
Con una mayor prevalencia en la esquizofrenia, el delirio es considerado como la marca de la psicosis. Desde un punto de vista clínico, el delirio es predominantemente entendido como un tipo de creencia desadaptativa debido a sus consecuencias socio-funcionales para las diversas dimensiones de la vida de los pacientes. Sin embargo, durante los ´últimos años parece haber resurgido la idea de que el delirio podría tener un rol adaptativo. Este capítulo explora este debate. Primero, revisamos el marco de referencia conceptual que parece definir la formulación dominante del debate, esto es, la idea de que los delirios pueden ser comprendidos como un tipo de creencia. A esto se le ha denominado el enfoque doxástico del delirio. Luego de esto, intentaremos clarificar las dos posiciones actuales del debate en torno al potencial valor adaptativo de los delirios. Finalmente, en la última sección terminaremos revisando algunos desafíos que parecen quedar abiertos cuando intentamos definir el rol adaptativo del delirio
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