Normativismo, naturalismo y lo patológico del delirio
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2025.10.4897Palabras clave:
Delirio, Normativismo, Naturalismo, Patología, EnfermedadResumen
Comúnmente, el delirio es caracterizado como un estado mental patológico, una señal de que algo no anda bien en la mente. Sin embargo, existe un debate en la filosofía de la ciencia respecto de qué es lo que haría exactamente a un delirio patológico, sobre todo, en virtud de que sus expresiones paradigmáticas se observan en condiciones psiquiátricas de alta complejidad tales como la esquizofrenia y la depresión mayor. Este capítulo revisa dos alternativas a este problema, esto es, el normativismo y el naturalismo. Luego de analizar sus principales propuestas y respectivas debilidades, se concluye que ninguna de ellas por sí solo ofrece una alternativa lo suficientemente fuerte. Se concluye que las posiciones que combinan ambos enfoques podrían ser una opción plausible en el marco del debate en cuestión y se analiza como éste asunto podría aplicarse al caso del delirio.
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